The language is focused on the fact that the targeted 4 channel dvr items are designed to avoid security features on a device. The intention is that if an item is designed to bypass the security features on your phone or computer and then scoops up or changes the data on it, it will be caught. This feature is at the heart of many government IT intrusion solutions being sold. Products like Hacking Teams Da Vinci Early brochures explain how Remote Control System “bypasses protection systems such as antivirus antispyware and personal firewalls.”  Meanwhile FinFisher boasts it’s capabilities provide for the “bypassing of 40 regularly test antivirus systems”

However, isolating the unique features of a product is the most challenging aspect of coming up with a definition, and questions remain as to the intended scope of these clauses.

A full analysis of what surveillance systems we think might be caught is on the way in collaboration with the New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute and Digitale Gesellschaft. Stay tuned.

“IP network surveillance systems”

The French proposal targeting “IP network surveillance systems” is likely to be aimed at controlling general traffic analysis systems such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) items, which can classify and collect information flowing through a network. IP (Internet protocol) is one of the core standards upon which today’s communications infrastructure is built.  Today IP networks are used to carry information security camera system from all our network devices including laptops and mobiles right the way around the world. Your online searches, emails and VoIP calls all transmit through these networks and protocols. The interception of these communications lies at the heart of many mass surveillance systems.

The French proposal seeks to control some of this technology:

5. A. 1. j. IP network communications surveillance systems or equipment, and specially designed components therefor, having all of the following:
1. Performing all of the following on a carrier class IP network (e.g., national grade IP backbone):
a. Analysis at the application layer (e.g., Layer 7 of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model (ISO/IEC 7498-1));
b. Extraction of selected metadata and application content (e.g., voice, video, messages, attachments); and
c. Indexing of extracted data; and surveillance system
2. Being specially designed to carry out all of the following:
a. Execution of searches on the basis of 'hard selectors'; and
b. Mapping of the relational network of an individual or of a group of people.

modification of 8 channel dvr system

Understanding what the new controls actually do is heavily based on how individual states 16 channel dvr implement the agreements. The ostensible intention of the additional controls is clear enough however.

The two new categories are the result of two separate proposals from the French and UK governments. Proposals to include new categories to the control list are discussed periodically throughout the year by various working groups focusing on technical and policy-related aspects.  However, it is the Plenary meeting, which convened last week, that is the official decision-making and political body of the Arrangement that formally introduces new controls. The Arrangement is also supported by a small secretariat based in Vienna. For an inside scoop on how these negotiations tend to unfold, some of the US embassy cables are highly recommended.

“Intrusion Software”

The UK proposal was aimed at controlling what they called “Advanced Persistent Threat Software and related equipment (offensive cyber tools)”. It’s now clear that what they meant by this is malware and rootkits, which governments can use to extract network camera  data from and take control of a device.

The term used “intrusion software”, echoes the “offensive IT intrusion” marketing lines used by FinFisher and others and defines itself as:

"Software" specially designed or modified to avoid detection by 'monitoring tools', or to defeat 'protective countermeasures', of a computer or network capable device, and performing any of the following:
a. The extraction of data or information, from a computer or network capable device, or the modification of 8 channel dvr system or user data; or
b. The modification of the standard execution path of a program or process in order to allow the execution of externally provided instructions.

monumental 16 channel nvr challenge

We also need to bring to this debate the telecommunication surveillance system companies that operate the infrastructure of our communications, and those who build the technologies that allow surveillance to take place. They are equally responsible for raising the bar and pushing back against the encroachment of intelligence agencies into our private communications. Their silence is particularly noted.

Which is why Privacy International, along with EFF, Access and the support of 300 civil society organisations, launched the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance in September 2013. These principles begin from the fundamental premise that all communications should be free from the interference of governments and corporations. Surveillance must be done in accordance with human rights safeguards, and the principles apportion responsibility for protecting nvr sytem the privacy and security of communications to both the public and private sector.

We look forward to continuing our work with industry leaders to finally achieve the goals they have articulated, which we support. However, we hope that they will also continue to raise the bar and be more ambitious in their aims in order to respond to the serious nature of these threats to our technologies and our confidence in them. Ensuring that the digital technologies we use everyday are free from pervasive State snooping is a monumental 16 channel nvr challenge, and there is much to be done.Two new categories of surveillance systems were added into the dual-use goods and technologies control list of the Wassenaar Arrangement last week in Vienna, recognising for the first time the need to subject spying tools used by intelligence agencies and law enforcement to export controls.

While there are many questions that still need to be answered, Privacy International cautiously welcomes these additions to the Wassenaar 4 channel nvr Arrangement. Undoubtedly, these new controls don’t cover everything they could, but the recognition that something needs to be done at Wassenaar level is a foundation to build from.

enshrined in internationalsecurity systems law

 by openly and consensually ip camera agreeing that the lack of oversight on the export of these systems must change, governments are now finally putting the surveillance system sector firmly front and centre.A strong, unified voice from the tech industry is absolutely essential to reforming the mass and intrusive surveillance programs being run by the Five Eyes, so we welcome today's statement from AOL, Apple, Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Twitter, and Yahoo.

Companies have obligations to respect human rights and not be complicit in mass surveillance. Given what has been publicly revealed over the past six months, we must know for certain that the companies we entrust with our information on a daily basis are defending users and pushing back against government requests for our data. The launch of these industry principles today are a first step to restoring much of the trust in the industry that has been thrown into question since the release of the Snowden documents.

These industry principles are an important reminder that the fight against mass surveillance has only just begun. As the initial uproar at the tactics and methods being secretly undertaken by the NSA, GCHQ and other Five Eyes agencies subsides, we are left with a stark reality: gross surveillance camera  violations of the right to privacy as States access and share bulk metadata records, outdated laws that give free reign to intelligence agencies to conduct extraterritorial spying, eroded encryption standards and spreading distrust in technologies. It is time for drastic changes to how intelligence is regulated, conducted and overseen, and we welcome these companies' contribution to this debate.

However, there is much to be done. Given the global scale of these industries and the infrastructure and services they administer, we need reforms that protect all people and not just the US citizens who use these companies’ services. Privacy is a universal right, enshrined in internationalsecurity systems law, and must be protected, respected, and upheld as such. We need common standards that apply to all data held by US companies, not rules that afford different protections to individuals depending on their citizenship.

mobile network surveillance system operators

Given the number of mobile network surveillance system operators and handsets in a given area, IMSI Catchers need to operate as multiple fake towers simultaneously to harvest as much data as possible in a short amount of time. Some report a rate of 1200 IMSIs per minute across 5 networks while others boast simultaneous voice intercepts as featured on the Surveillance Industry Index. Often it will operate by purporting to be many towers from the same network provider thereby reducing the time it takes to get all the IMSIs from users on a popular network.

Each fake tower will emit a signal containing numbers to tell a mobile phone how to talk to it when it wants to make a call or send a text. Or information on how to register with it so the tower can contact it when an incoming call or text arrives. Specifically, the tower will send a country code and an operator code to the handset. In normal circumstances, this allows phones to stay connected to their operators' towers and not to start roaming in border areas if another native tower is present.

It is these values that were problematic in the GSOC case. Irish towers should not be identifying themselves as being in the UK or offering the service of a UK network provider. The mobile phone of a UK 16 channel nvr visitor to GSOC would have spotted its native tower and connected to it. Depending on the model of IMSI Catcher used, full intercept of all data to and from that handset would then be possible.

It is interesting to note that the fake UK network was the only one detected by Verrimus. However, given that IMSI Catchers 4 channel nvr operate multiple fake towers simultaneously, it is highly likely that one or more Irish networks were also being intercepted. Very often a misconfiguration, such as an incorrect country code, is the only evidence available of an IMSI Catcher being deployed when forensic tools are not being used to look for one. This recently occurred around the Ecuadorian Embassy in London where base stations from a Ugandan telco were mysteriously popping up.

indiscriminate ip camera mass surveillance

IMSI Catchers are used by authorities around the world to put large groups of people under indiscriminate ip camera mass surveillance via their mobile phone. IMSI Catchers started off infiltrating GSM networks with the only goal: capture the unique SIM card number that identifies the user called the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) - hence the name IMSI Catcher.

When the IMSI Catcher is turned on, it signals to all nearby devices that it is a legitimate part of the mobile communications network, even though it isn't. The IMSIs of the mobile phones are voluntarily surrendered by the mobile phone when it connects to the tower. By having the strongest signal or manipulating certain parameters, an IMSI Catcher entices all phones to connect to it and thereby get the unique identifier for every individual in an area. This works remarkably well in protests and public demonstrations and events, as was reported by the people of Ukraine recently during their protests.

However, in the last 10-15 years as the use of IMSI Catchers has likely grown, they have evolved to include much more sophisticated capabilities. Nowadays, they can:

force phones to stop using encryption (A5/1) and move to unencrypted channels (A5/0) to allow for easier interception;
jam the 3G spectrum so phones would default back to 2G where interception could occur;
get an accurate location of every individual within its reach of around 1km
deny service to one or all users;
intercept the content of calls, text messages and data;
and reportedly surveillance camera alter messages in transit.
Nowadays, full 3G IMSI Catchers are the pride of many surveillance companies attending government sponsored trade shows to sell their wares to any interested agency. Companies such as CellXion, Forensic Telecommunications Services, and Gamma International provide such products. Not only have the capabilities improved but the devices have shrunk to the size of a large mobile phone and costing around €250-€500.

However, if you prefer to get your hands dirty, you can build one for yourself using a Software Defined Radio and free software called OpenBTS. You can also put together a full GSM call, text and data interception device (even where the target’s data is encrypted) using a €10 phone, free software security systems from Osmocomm and a laptop running open source software. The legality of doing this, however, will vary by jurisdiction.

prompt 16 channel dvr foreign

Intelligence officials asked the Guardian, New York Times and ProPublica not to publish this article, saying that it might prompt 16 channel dvr foreign targets to switch to new forms of encryption or communications that would be harder to collect or read.

The three organisations removed some specific facts but decided to publish the story because of the value of a public debate about government actions that weaken the most powerful tools for protecting the privacy of internet users in the US and worldwide.The recent revelations surrounding the bugging of the Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) has raised a number of important questions about the use of surveillance technologies in Ireland, including whether fake base stations were deployed in order to monitor mobile networks near GSOC's office.

First, some background. The Garda Siochana are the Irish police force and are overseen by GSOC, who have investigated members of the police force on a number of occasions. Approximately a year ago, GSOC decided to conduct a security sweep of their office and brought in Verrimus, a UK-based counter-surveillance company. During the course of their investigation, they uncovered 3 anomalies that gave rise to suspicion that the GSOC office had been subjected network camera to surveillance. Two of the potential breaches related to surveillance of specific internal telephone equipment, and a third breach which revealed the presence of a UK mobile network in the vicinity of the GSOC office that purported to be from a UK network operator that does not operate in Ireland.

Possibly, a misconfigured base station hastily rolled out by an Irish mobile operator could have caused this. However, if one of the Irish mobile telcos deployed such a misconfigured device then one would hope the firm would have come forward by now.

Yet, no one has. The only remaining possibility, then, is that a device used to conduct surveillance was intentionally security camera system deployed that purported to be a legitimate mobile phone tower. In surveillance circles, such a device is called an IMSI Catcher (aka IMSI Grabber or Stingray).