2014年9月1日星期一
The language is focused on the fact that the targeted 4 channel dvr items are designed to avoid security features on a device. The intention is that if an item is designed to bypass the security features on your phone or computer and then scoops up or changes the data on it, it will be caught. This feature is at the heart of many government IT intrusion solutions being sold. Products like Hacking Teams Da Vinci Early brochures explain how Remote Control System “bypasses protection systems such as antivirus antispyware and personal firewalls.” Meanwhile FinFisher boasts it’s capabilities provide for the “bypassing of 40 regularly test antivirus systems”
However, isolating the unique features of a product is the most challenging aspect of coming up with a definition, and questions remain as to the intended scope of these clauses.
A full analysis of what surveillance systems we think might be caught is on the way in collaboration with the New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute and Digitale Gesellschaft. Stay tuned.
“IP network surveillance systems”
The French proposal targeting “IP network surveillance systems” is likely to be aimed at controlling general traffic analysis systems such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) items, which can classify and collect information flowing through a network. IP (Internet protocol) is one of the core standards upon which today’s communications infrastructure is built. Today IP networks are used to carry information security camera system from all our network devices including laptops and mobiles right the way around the world. Your online searches, emails and VoIP calls all transmit through these networks and protocols. The interception of these communications lies at the heart of many mass surveillance systems.
The French proposal seeks to control some of this technology:
5. A. 1. j. IP network communications surveillance systems or equipment, and specially designed components therefor, having all of the following:
1. Performing all of the following on a carrier class IP network (e.g., national grade IP backbone):
a. Analysis at the application layer (e.g., Layer 7 of Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model (ISO/IEC 7498-1));
b. Extraction of selected metadata and application content (e.g., voice, video, messages, attachments); and
c. Indexing of extracted data; and surveillance system
2. Being specially designed to carry out all of the following:
a. Execution of searches on the basis of 'hard selectors'; and
b. Mapping of the relational network of an individual or of a group of people.
modification of 8 channel dvr system
Understanding what the new controls actually do is heavily based on how individual states 16 channel dvr implement the agreements. The ostensible intention of the additional controls is clear enough however.
The two new categories are the result of two separate proposals from the French and UK governments. Proposals to include new categories to the control list are discussed periodically throughout the year by various working groups focusing on technical and policy-related aspects. However, it is the Plenary meeting, which convened last week, that is the official decision-making and political body of the Arrangement that formally introduces new controls. The Arrangement is also supported by a small secretariat based in Vienna. For an inside scoop on how these negotiations tend to unfold, some of the US embassy cables are highly recommended.
“Intrusion Software”
The UK proposal was aimed at controlling what they called “Advanced Persistent Threat Software and related equipment (offensive cyber tools)”. It’s now clear that what they meant by this is malware and rootkits, which governments can use to extract network camera data from and take control of a device.
The term used “intrusion software”, echoes the “offensive IT intrusion” marketing lines used by FinFisher and others and defines itself as:
"Software" specially designed or modified to avoid detection by 'monitoring tools', or to defeat 'protective countermeasures', of a computer or network capable device, and performing any of the following:
a. The extraction of data or information, from a computer or network capable device, or the modification of 8 channel dvr system or user data; or
b. The modification of the standard execution path of a program or process in order to allow the execution of externally provided instructions.
monumental 16 channel nvr challenge
We also need to bring to this debate the telecommunication surveillance system companies that operate the infrastructure of our communications, and those who build the technologies that allow surveillance to take place. They are equally responsible for raising the bar and pushing back against the encroachment of intelligence agencies into our private communications. Their silence is particularly noted.
Which is why Privacy International, along with EFF, Access and the support of 300 civil society organisations, launched the International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications Surveillance in September 2013. These principles begin from the fundamental premise that all communications should be free from the interference of governments and corporations. Surveillance must be done in accordance with human rights safeguards, and the principles apportion responsibility for protecting nvr sytem the privacy and security of communications to both the public and private sector.
We look forward to continuing our work with industry leaders to finally achieve the goals they have articulated, which we support. However, we hope that they will also continue to raise the bar and be more ambitious in their aims in order to respond to the serious nature of these threats to our technologies and our confidence in them. Ensuring that the digital technologies we use everyday are free from pervasive State snooping is a monumental 16 channel nvr challenge, and there is much to be done.Two new categories of surveillance systems were added into the dual-use goods and technologies control list of the Wassenaar Arrangement last week in Vienna, recognising for the first time the need to subject spying tools used by intelligence agencies and law enforcement to export controls.
While there are many questions that still need to be answered, Privacy International cautiously welcomes these additions to the Wassenaar 4 channel nvr Arrangement. Undoubtedly, these new controls don’t cover everything they could, but the recognition that something needs to be done at Wassenaar level is a foundation to build from.
enshrined in internationalsecurity systems law
by openly and consensually ip camera agreeing that the lack of oversight on the export of these systems must change, governments are now finally putting the surveillance system sector firmly front and centre.A strong, unified voice from the tech industry is absolutely essential to reforming the mass and intrusive surveillance programs being run by the Five Eyes, so we welcome today's statement from AOL, Apple, Google, Facebook, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Twitter, and Yahoo.
Companies have obligations to respect human rights and not be complicit in mass surveillance. Given what has been publicly revealed over the past six months, we must know for certain that the companies we entrust with our information on a daily basis are defending users and pushing back against government requests for our data. The launch of these industry principles today are a first step to restoring much of the trust in the industry that has been thrown into question since the release of the Snowden documents.
These industry principles are an important reminder that the fight against mass surveillance has only just begun. As the initial uproar at the tactics and methods being secretly undertaken by the NSA, GCHQ and other Five Eyes agencies subsides, we are left with a stark reality: gross surveillance camera violations of the right to privacy as States access and share bulk metadata records, outdated laws that give free reign to intelligence agencies to conduct extraterritorial spying, eroded encryption standards and spreading distrust in technologies. It is time for drastic changes to how intelligence is regulated, conducted and overseen, and we welcome these companies' contribution to this debate.
However, there is much to be done. Given the global scale of these industries and the infrastructure and services they administer, we need reforms that protect all people and not just the US citizens who use these companies’ services. Privacy is a universal right, enshrined in internationalsecurity systems law, and must be protected, respected, and upheld as such. We need common standards that apply to all data held by US companies, not rules that afford different protections to individuals depending on their citizenship.
2014年8月25日星期一
mobile network surveillance system operators
Given the number of mobile network surveillance system operators and handsets in a given area, IMSI Catchers need to operate as multiple fake towers simultaneously to harvest as much data as possible in a short amount of time. Some report a rate of 1200 IMSIs per minute across 5 networks while others boast simultaneous voice intercepts as featured on the Surveillance Industry Index. Often it will operate by purporting to be many towers from the same network provider thereby reducing the time it takes to get all the IMSIs from users on a popular network.
Each fake tower will emit a signal containing numbers to tell a mobile phone how to talk to it when it wants to make a call or send a text. Or information on how to register with it so the tower can contact it when an incoming call or text arrives. Specifically, the tower will send a country code and an operator code to the handset. In normal circumstances, this allows phones to stay connected to their operators' towers and not to start roaming in border areas if another native tower is present.
It is these values that were problematic in the GSOC case. Irish towers should not be identifying themselves as being in the UK or offering the service of a UK network provider. The mobile phone of a UK 16 channel nvr visitor to GSOC would have spotted its native tower and connected to it. Depending on the model of IMSI Catcher used, full intercept of all data to and from that handset would then be possible.
It is interesting to note that the fake UK network was the only one detected by Verrimus. However, given that IMSI Catchers 4 channel nvr operate multiple fake towers simultaneously, it is highly likely that one or more Irish networks were also being intercepted. Very often a misconfiguration, such as an incorrect country code, is the only evidence available of an IMSI Catcher being deployed when forensic tools are not being used to look for one. This recently occurred around the Ecuadorian Embassy in London where base stations from a Ugandan telco were mysteriously popping up.
indiscriminate ip camera mass surveillance
IMSI Catchers are used by authorities around the world to put large groups of people under indiscriminate ip camera mass surveillance via their mobile phone. IMSI Catchers started off infiltrating GSM networks with the only goal: capture the unique SIM card number that identifies the user called the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) - hence the name IMSI Catcher.
When the IMSI Catcher is turned on, it signals to all nearby devices that it is a legitimate part of the mobile communications network, even though it isn't. The IMSIs of the mobile phones are voluntarily surrendered by the mobile phone when it connects to the tower. By having the strongest signal or manipulating certain parameters, an IMSI Catcher entices all phones to connect to it and thereby get the unique identifier for every individual in an area. This works remarkably well in protests and public demonstrations and events, as was reported by the people of Ukraine recently during their protests.
However, in the last 10-15 years as the use of IMSI Catchers has likely grown, they have evolved to include much more sophisticated capabilities. Nowadays, they can:
force phones to stop using encryption (A5/1) and move to unencrypted channels (A5/0) to allow for easier interception;
jam the 3G spectrum so phones would default back to 2G where interception could occur;
get an accurate location of every individual within its reach of around 1km
deny service to one or all users;
intercept the content of calls, text messages and data;
and reportedly surveillance camera alter messages in transit.
Nowadays, full 3G IMSI Catchers are the pride of many surveillance companies attending government sponsored trade shows to sell their wares to any interested agency. Companies such as CellXion, Forensic Telecommunications Services, and Gamma International provide such products. Not only have the capabilities improved but the devices have shrunk to the size of a large mobile phone and costing around €250-€500.
However, if you prefer to get your hands dirty, you can build one for yourself using a Software Defined Radio and free software called OpenBTS. You can also put together a full GSM call, text and data interception device (even where the target’s data is encrypted) using a €10 phone, free software security systems from Osmocomm and a laptop running open source software. The legality of doing this, however, will vary by jurisdiction.
prompt 16 channel dvr foreign
Intelligence officials asked the Guardian, New York Times and ProPublica not to publish this article, saying that it might prompt 16 channel dvr foreign targets to switch to new forms of encryption or communications that would be harder to collect or read.
The three organisations removed some specific facts but decided to publish the story because of the value of a public debate about government actions that weaken the most powerful tools for protecting the privacy of internet users in the US and worldwide.The recent revelations surrounding the bugging of the Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission (GSOC) has raised a number of important questions about the use of surveillance technologies in Ireland, including whether fake base stations were deployed in order to monitor mobile networks near GSOC's office.
First, some background. The Garda Siochana are the Irish police force and are overseen by GSOC, who have investigated members of the police force on a number of occasions. Approximately a year ago, GSOC decided to conduct a security sweep of their office and brought in Verrimus, a UK-based counter-surveillance company. During the course of their investigation, they uncovered 3 anomalies that gave rise to suspicion that the GSOC office had been subjected network camera to surveillance. Two of the potential breaches related to surveillance of specific internal telephone equipment, and a third breach which revealed the presence of a UK mobile network in the vicinity of the GSOC office that purported to be from a UK network operator that does not operate in Ireland.
Possibly, a misconfigured base station hastily rolled out by an Irish mobile operator could have caused this. However, if one of the Irish mobile telcos deployed such a misconfigured device then one would hope the firm would have come forward by now.
Yet, no one has. The only remaining possibility, then, is that a device used to conduct surveillance was intentionally security camera system deployed that purported to be a legitimate mobile phone tower. In surveillance circles, such a device is called an IMSI Catcher (aka IMSI Grabber or Stingray).
information 8 channel dvr gleaned
To help secure an insider advantage, GCHQ also established a Humint Operations Team (HOT). Humint, short for "human intelligence" refers to information 8 channel dvr gleaned directly from sources or undercover agents.
This GCHQ team was, according to an internal document, "responsible for identifying, recruiting and running covert agents in the global telecommunications industry."
"This enables GCHQ to tackle some of its most challenging targets," the report said. The efforts made by the NSA and GCHQ against encryption technologies may have negative consequences for all internet users, experts warn.
"Backdoors are fundamentally in conflict with good security," said Christopher Soghoian, principal technologist and senior policy analyst at the American Civil Liberties Union. "Backdoors expose all users of a backdoored system, not just intelligence agency targets, to heightened risk of data compromise." This is because the insertion of backdoors in a software product, particularly those that can be used to obtain unencrypted user communications or data, significantly increases the difficulty of designing a secure product."
This was a view echoed in a recent paper by Stephanie Pell, a former prosecutor at the US Department of Justice and non-resident fellow at the Center for Internet and Security at Stanford Law School.
"[An] encrypted communications system with a lawful interception back door is far more likely to result in the catastrophic loss of communications 4 channel dvr confidentiality than a system that never has access to the unencrypted communications of its users," she states.
2014年8月20日星期三
monitor 8 channel dvr social networks
providing an opportunity for a hearing to challenge security systems fairness of the predictive process; and
the establishment of an impartial adjudicator and judicial review to ensure accountability of those who adjudicate others, i.e. those who deprive individuals of a liberty interest do so without unwarranted bias or a direct financial interest in the outcome.
The use of big data is intrinsically linked to ethical values, which means that the starting point must be the development international guidelines governing access to and analysis of individuals’ data. Thus as Crawford and Schultz conclude:The latest Snowden document revelation, which shows how GCHQ and the NSA are conducting broad, real-time monitoring of YouTube, Facebook, and Blogger using a program called "Squeaky Dolphin," is the most recent demonstration of the immense interception capabilities of intelligence services.
Despite the program's cute name, "Squeaky Dolphin" is shocking in its ability to intercept raw data, which includes sensitive personal and location information, and keep tabs on people across the world who are simply uploading videos or 'liking' the links on their friends' Facebook walls. Such massive, unrestrained capabilities are no way consistent with international law, as their capabilities and execution are clearly neither necessary nor proportionate. Because of this, Privacy International has litigation 16 channel dvr underfoot to challenge the legality of GCHQ's surveillance activities on the grounds that they fly in the face of the UK's human rights obligations. Operations like Squeaky Dolphin are yet another manifestation of GCHQ's disregard for privacy rights, and starkly illustrate the problem of secret, unaccountable intelligence gathering.
Frighteningly, the capabilities demonstrated by Squeaky Dolphin - the combination of tapping IP networks and the construction of that with sources such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and other services - are not the exclusive preserve of the NSA and GCHQ. Privacy International's Surveillance Industry Index shows that surveillance companies are marketing and selling these services right off the shelf, giving willing governments anywhere the ability to intercept huge amounts of raw data, monitor 8 channel dvr social networks in real time, and analyse the information obtained to create profiles on specific individuals and targets.
Amassing ip camera and analysing data
Data is data. Yet the short- and long-term consequences of collecting data in environments where appropriate legal and institutional safeguards are lacking have not been properly explored. Amassing ip camera and analysing data always has the potential to enable surveillance, regardless of the well-intentioned objectives that may underpin its collection. Development is not merely about economic prosperity, and social services. It is about providing individuals with a safe environment in which they can live in dignity.
Towards accountability
In their recently published paper, Big data and Due Process: Towards A Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, Crawford and Schultz propose a new framework for a “right to procedural data due process,” arguing that “individuals who are privately and often secretly 'judged' by big data should have similar rights to those judged by the courts with respect to how their personal data has been used in such adjudications”.
Unlike the common model of personally identifiable information, big data does not easily fall within legally protected categories of data. This means there are no legal provisions protecting the data surveillance camera collected, processed and disclosed, and the rights of individuals whose data is being analysed.
Therefore, Crawford and Schultz have innovatively re-visited some relevant founding principles of the legal concept of due process. Due process (as understood in the American context) prohibits the government from depriving an individual’s rights to life, liberty, or property without affording them access to certain basic procedural components of the adjudication process. The concept equally exists under European human rights law, though is more commonly called procedural fairness.
By doing so, Crawford and Schultz are challenging the fairness of the process of collection rather than the attempting to regulate it, which would be more complex and contested. They have thus applied these principles to address existing privacy concerns linked to the development and use of big data, namely:
requiring those who use big data to “adjudicate” others, to post some form of notice disclosing not only the type of predictions they are attempting, but also the general sources of data that they are drawing surveillance system upon as inputs, including a means whereby those whose personal data in included can learn of that fact;
2014年8月15日星期五
wireless ip camera videos
This is exactly what GCHQ is doing. Internal documents explain that they are
interested in "[n]ot just collecting voice and SMS and geo-locating phone, but
getting intelligence from all the extra functionality that iPhones and
BlackBerrys offer." Further documents explain that GCHQ can now obtain “any
content from phone, e.g. SMS, MMS, e-mails, web history, call records,ip camera wireless ip camera videos,
photos, address book, notes, calendar.”
interested in "[n]ot just collecting voice and SMS and geo-locating phone, but
getting intelligence from all the extra functionality that iPhones and
BlackBerrys offer." Further documents explain that GCHQ can now obtain “any
content from phone, e.g. SMS, MMS, e-mails, web history, call records,ip camera wireless ip camera videos,
photos, address book, notes, calendar.”
GCHQ’s ability to do so relies on a malware toolkit named, oddly, after
characters in the TV series The Smurfs. An ability to make both iPhone and
Android phones’ microphones 'hot', in order to remotely switch on the
microphone and listen in to conversations is named "Nosey Smurf". High-
precision geolocation is called "Tracker Smurf". Covertly switching on a phone
is codenamed "Dreamy Smurf" while the malware’s concealment capabilities are
codenamed "Paranoid Smurf".
characters in the TV series The Smurfs. An ability to make both iPhone and
Android phones’ microphones 'hot', in order to remotely switch on the
microphone and listen in to conversations is named "Nosey Smurf". High-
precision geolocation is called "Tracker Smurf". Covertly switching on a phone
is codenamed "Dreamy Smurf" while the malware’s concealment capabilities are
codenamed "Paranoid Smurf".
Disproportionate interference
This completely unchecked deployment of government malware amounts to some of
the most intrusive forms of surveillance any government has conducted.
the most intrusive forms of surveillance any government has conducted.
In allowing GCHQ to extract a huge amount of information, and to turn an
individual’s own devices against them by co-opting the devices as instruments
of video and audio surveillance, it is at least as intrusive as searching a
person’s house and installing bugs so as to enable continued monitoring. In
fact, it is more intrusive, because of the amount of information now generated
and stored by computers and mobile devices, the speed, ease and
surreptitiousness with which surveillance camera security systems can be conducted, and because it
allows the ongoing surveillance to continue wherever the affected person may
be.
individual’s own devices against them by co-opting the devices as instruments
of video and audio surveillance, it is at least as intrusive as searching a
person’s house and installing bugs so as to enable continued monitoring. In
fact, it is more intrusive, because of the amount of information now generated
and stored by computers and mobile devices, the speed, ease and
surreptitiousness with which surveillance camera security systems can be conducted, and because it
allows the ongoing surveillance to continue wherever the affected person may
be.
In these circumstances any justification would have to be extremely specific
and compelling in order to render that activity proportionate. Regrettably, no
such consideration has been given to this in public debate. Secret action, on
the basis of secret policy, is the order of the day.
and compelling in order to render that activity proportionate. Regrettably, no
such consideration has been given to this in public debate. Secret action, on
the basis of secret policy, is the order of the day.
Millions of devices
Far from this tactic being deployed only in exceptional circumstances, the NSA
has aggressively developed these tools to infect potentially millions of
computers and phones worldwide,surveillance system according to The Intercept. GCHQ plays an
integral role. Using tools like TURBINE, designed to “relieve the user from
needing to know/care about the details” the NSA is now able to conduct
“industrial-scale exploitation”.
has aggressively developed these tools to infect potentially millions of
computers and phones worldwide,surveillance system according to The Intercept. GCHQ plays an
integral role. Using tools like TURBINE, designed to “relieve the user from
needing to know/care about the details” the NSA is now able to conduct
“industrial-scale exploitation”.
That technique involves covert installation of software onto the user’s
computer through one of a number of means, such as tricking the user into
clicking a malicious link, or injectingip camera system 4ch NVR System their malicious code into the network
transmission that individuals receive when browsing websites like Facebook or
LinkedIn so as to transfer the malware as part of the computer’s ordinary
downloading of data.
computer through one of a number of means, such as tricking the user into
clicking a malicious link, or injectingip camera system 4ch NVR System their malicious code into the network
transmission that individuals receive when browsing websites like Facebook or
LinkedIn so as to transfer the malware as part of the computer’s ordinary
downloading of data.
2014年8月8日星期五
video surveillance camera security systems
as Mr Justice Green, in his carefully-reasoned judgment, found that HMRC had committed a serious ip camera error in not providing information about whether it was investigating British company Gamma International for illegal exporting spyware to repressive regimes. Describing the actions of HMRC as “irrational” and “simply inconsistent with the legislation”, the judgment quashed HRMC’s decision and ordered it to again consider Privacy International’s request.
The judgment provides clear authority that the public is entitled to know what HMRC is doing to investigate and if appropriate prosecute companies that are sending dangerous surveillance technologies to countries where it is likely to be used for human rights abuses.
It also establishes the important principle that NGOs and pressure groups such as Privacy International, just like the press, “act as guardians of the public conscience” and play a significant role in ensuring transparency and enforcing legal rights in court. As such, Mr Justice Green remarked, “the rationale which justifies the provision of information surveillance camera security systems by HMRC to the press applies in large measure to disclosure of information to pressure groups and other NGOs”.
The Court considered the evidence of two activists who contend that they had been subjected to surveillance by governments of countries to which FinFisher had allegedly been exported. Dr Ala’a Shehabi, a Britsh-born citizen and pro-democracy activist in Bahrain, and Mr Tadesse Kersmo, an Ethiopian political refugee living in the UK, both spoke of their distress at HMRC’s refusal to disclose information about whether they were considering instituting criminal proceedings against Gamma.
Privacy International’s Deputy Director, Eric King, said
For two years we have been asking Government to come clean on what they are doing when it comes to the illegal export of FinFisher and to stand up for victims targeted by surveillance technology made on British soil. Today’s ruling is an important victory, and a step in the right direction to holding Gamma International, and the rest of this secretive industry, to account.”
Dr. Ala'a Shehabi said:
Now that the High Court has rightfully said that HMRC’s actions were unlawful, I hope that Government takes action to bring justice to all of the victims whose rights have been violated because of this intrusive spyware. More broadly it should take responsibility for all dual-use exports that are knowingly sent to repressive governments that will likely use them for criminal activity including human rights violations such as Bahrain."
Tadesse Kersmo said:
network camera 16ch NVR Recorder After I found out that Ethiopians in Diaspora were spied on through my computer, I wanted to know what UK Government was doing to protect my rights and prevent the spread of technologies like FinFisher around the world. I believe this ruling is critical to finally bringing accountability to the likes of Gamma who sell their technologies to repressive regimes like the Ethiopian government.”
The judgment provides clear authority that the public is entitled to know what HMRC is doing to investigate and if appropriate prosecute companies that are sending dangerous surveillance technologies to countries where it is likely to be used for human rights abuses.
It also establishes the important principle that NGOs and pressure groups such as Privacy International, just like the press, “act as guardians of the public conscience” and play a significant role in ensuring transparency and enforcing legal rights in court. As such, Mr Justice Green remarked, “the rationale which justifies the provision of information surveillance camera security systems by HMRC to the press applies in large measure to disclosure of information to pressure groups and other NGOs”.
The Court considered the evidence of two activists who contend that they had been subjected to surveillance by governments of countries to which FinFisher had allegedly been exported. Dr Ala’a Shehabi, a Britsh-born citizen and pro-democracy activist in Bahrain, and Mr Tadesse Kersmo, an Ethiopian political refugee living in the UK, both spoke of their distress at HMRC’s refusal to disclose information about whether they were considering instituting criminal proceedings against Gamma.
Privacy International’s Deputy Director, Eric King, said
For two years we have been asking Government to come clean on what they are doing when it comes to the illegal export of FinFisher and to stand up for victims targeted by surveillance technology made on British soil. Today’s ruling is an important victory, and a step in the right direction to holding Gamma International, and the rest of this secretive industry, to account.”
Dr. Ala'a Shehabi said:
Now that the High Court has rightfully said that HMRC’s actions were unlawful, I hope that Government takes action to bring justice to all of the victims whose rights have been violated because of this intrusive spyware. More broadly it should take responsibility for all dual-use exports that are knowingly sent to repressive governments that will likely use them for criminal activity including human rights violations such as Bahrain."
Tadesse Kersmo said:
network camera 16ch NVR Recorder After I found out that Ethiopians in Diaspora were spied on through my computer, I wanted to know what UK Government was doing to protect my rights and prevent the spread of technologies like FinFisher around the world. I believe this ruling is critical to finally bringing accountability to the likes of Gamma who sell their technologies to repressive regimes like the Ethiopian government.”
2014年8月6日星期三
surveillance camera
In an interesting turn of events this week, a CARICOM organization of which the State of Belize is a member has issued a statement supporting the recent firing of Professor Brendan Bain as head of the Caribbean HIV AIDS Regional Training Network (CHART) and making it unequivocally clear that it stands with UNIBAM in its bid to get sodomy laws removed from the nation’s law books.
Of note is that the Caribbean surveillance camera security systems Court of Justice, the judicial organ of CARICOM, is at the same time, set to hear a challenge by LGBT activist Maurice Tomlinson against immigration laws in Belize and Trinidad, which he claims discriminate against LGBT visitors.
On Wednesday, Pan Caribbean Partnership against HIV and AIDS (PANCAP) issued a statement via the CARICOM Secretariat, in which it said that Bain’s testimony in the Caleb Orozco (UNIBAM’s Executive Director) v. A.G. Belize (2012) case is not consistent with the stated goals of PANCAP to reduce stigma and eliminate discrimination, and is, furthermore, in dissonance with PANCAP’s ongoing work to remove discriminatory laws and affirm human rights.
Interestingly, PANCAP is an agency of CARICOM, and Belize, which is being sued by UNIBAM, is a member of both bodies.
PANCAP said that, “Currently, 11 CARICOM States have laws which criminalize consensual same-sex relationships between adults in private. The Global Commission on HIV and the Law has found that countries which criminalize same-sex sexual activity have higher HIV prevalence rates among men who have sex with men (MSM) than countries that do not; that criminalizing HIV transmission harms HIV prevention and treatment…”
It said that this view was communicated network camera surveillance system to Professor Bain during the 15th Meeting of the Priority Areas Coordinating Committee (PACC), a technical committee of the PANCAP Executive Board, which was held via teleconference on 15 January 2014, and Bain subsequently resigned on 14 March 2014.
As we reported in our last issue of Amandala, Bain’s contract as head of CHART was terminated by the University of the West Indies last Tuesday, May 20. Supporters in Belize and Jamaica held protests, calling the termination an unjust move to muzzle those who do not support the LGBT bid for special rights.
On Friday, May 23, Rev. Roosevelt Papouloute, president of the Belize Council of Churches, and Rev. Eugene Crawford, president 16ch NVR Recorder of the Evangelical Association of Belize, wrote UWI expressing their “disappointment and outrage,” and denouncing the termination and calling it “an act of extreme cowardice.”
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4ch NVR System
Last October, Prime Minister Dean Barrow described the Lands Department as “a hotbed of corruption,” and at an official press conference which he hosted in Belize ip camera system 4ch NVR System City today, Sharon Ramclam, the recently appointed Chief Executive Officer in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Agriculture, announced a sweeping reform which will entail the installation of surveillance cameras at all areas of the Lands Department where officers interface with members of the public.
One of those key areas will be the cashier’s section, due to the discovery last December of missing funds—the details of which Ramclam declined to disclose. She said that the matter is in the hands of the police, to whom they have reported the alleged theft.
The CEO announced at the press conference that the Department has been “faced with issues of theft,” but when we asked for details and clarification on how many such instances there were, she told us that the December incident is the only recent case of which she knows.
“We see that we definitely need to put more surveillance systems in monitoring the movement of staff throughout the Department, and especially at the district level, where they seem to be operating in silos and not connected to the headquarters in Belmopan,’ Ramclam said, adding that IT personnel will monitor these surveillance cameras daily.
The CEO also announced that they are “tightening up on land inspections,” with changes in the tracking system, but moreover, that new contract officers surveillance system will be hired whose specialization will be in customer service and delivery. These new staff will provide personalized service to persons who visit the offices to file applications.
According to Ramclam, Cabinet had approved a paper presented by the Lands Department. The CEO said that she and the Commissioner of Lands, Wilbur Vallejos, had set out plans to improve the Department and to provide for effective service delivery—changes which she admits will come at a substantial cost to Government.
“These new hires will all be on contract with exit 16ch NVR Recorder clauses so we can deal with any temptation they might have to go there and get on the bandwagon,” Barrow said.
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